In 2015, a center-left government introduced an electoral reform that replaced the binomial electoral system governing parliamentary elections since 1989 with a more proportional system. This article provides an account of the reform process, describes the new electoral law, and discusses the factors explaining the reform. We argue, first, that it was possible, due to the incentives the government provided, to secure the support of an ample majority of parliamentarians; also, a new and favorable political scenario had emerged, in which the support of the main right-wing parties was not necessary for the reform to pass. Second, we maintain that the reform sought mainly to resolve problems affecting the parties of the governing coalition related to negotiations of coalition lists for elections. As a complementary objective, the reform promoted a general interest by establishing rules that allowed a "fairer" system of representation and improved competitive conditions. T his country note examines the origins of the 2015 electoral reform. Since 1989, Chile had had a binomial system by which the country was divided into 60 districts for the election of deputies (the lower chamber of Congress) and 19 senatorial districts for the election of senators. In each district (all of them elect two parliamentarians), each party or pact between parties (which had to be national) could present up to two candidates. The determination of which candidate was elected as legislator was made according to the D'Hondt formula (and open lists). The new system changed the method of election substantially. First, it increased the number of deputies to 155 and senators to 50. In the new system, the 155 deputies are spread among 28 districts that distribute between 3 and 8 seats each. The Senate, for its part, is made up of 15 districts that elect between 2 and 5 seats each. The new system keeps the D'Hondt formula for determining those elected.
secured a proportion of seats far in excess of its votes in 2013 (55.6 percent vs. 50.6 percent)? How was it possible to achieve this result after 26 failed attempts to eliminate the binomial system, one of the authoritarian enclaves inherited from the Pinochet dictatorship (Garretón 1991) ? This article seeks answers to these questions.
We argue as follows. The main factor behind the reform was the need to resolve electoral-political problems that the binomial system created for the NM, a coalition made up of seven parties.
1 A major problem was the political cost of reaching agreements on the number of candidates that each party would place in the coalition list. In that system, the lists or electoral pacts (the ruling coalition, for example) could present a maximum of 120 candidates nationally (2 in each of the 60 districts). Consequently, the main parties of the coalition (i.e. PDC, PS, and PPD) were unable to compete in every district, but had to submit to arduous negotiations in order to settle on each pair of candidates. Now, with the increased district size (averaging 5.5) and with the possibility that each ticket could have M + 1 candidates (M meaning district magnitude), the maximum number of candidates for each list or pact would be 183. This increase would mean that each party could present more of its own candidates and thus not "leave itself out" in some districts. Moreover, for the coalition's smaller parties, spaces would open to allow them to compete in more electoral districts, helping them to gain national scope. This is not to argue, however, that all the parties of the coalition and the new parties that join it in the future would increase their representation substantially. What the reform does is open space to allow all of them to be included in the lists.
Factors speaking to the general interest, like reducing barriers of access to representation or reducing malapportionment, were relevant also. Although they played a secondary role, the first was a central factor in the support of small parties and independent parliamentarians for the reform.
In addition, the political scenario was very favorable for the reform. Seat distribution in Congress allowed the approval of the reform without the vote of the main right-wing opposition parties, National Renewal (RN) and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI). A key element was the government's strategy for securing the votes by convincing parliamentarians that the reform would not threaten substantially their chances for re-election.
This article first examines the reform process, its context, and the main issues under discussion. It describes the main features of the new electoral system and then discusses the objectives of the reform's promoters.
THE REFORM PROCESS
Between 1990 and 2010, successive governments of the Coalition of Parties for Democracy (Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, CPPD) had aspired to replace the binomial system with a more proportional formula, but every reform attempt had failed (Gamboa 2009 ). The major reason was that the CPPD's proposals never gained the support of the Alliance for Chile, the opposition coalition comprising the two right-wing parties, UDI and RN. Their support was essential, given that on its own the CPPD was unable to obtain the quorum mandated by the constitution to change the norms in question. In addition, while there was consensus within the CPPD on the need for electoral reform, agreement on the specific formula to replace the binomial system was another matter.
Electoral reform was never a priority for the Alliance administration . Nevertheless, two relevant developments took place during its period in office. The first was that Congress approved a constitutional reform (Law 20,725 of 2014) that introduced two major changes. The reform eliminated a constitutional provision establishing that the Chamber of Deputies (CD) must be composed of 120 members, allowing an increase in the number of elected deputies. It also increased the quorum required in the CD to change substantive aspects of the electoral law from 4/7 to 3/5 of the parliamentarians in office (the quorum in the Senate had already been 3/5 since the constitutional reform of 2005). The second important development was that RN and the PDC agreed on a reform of the electoral system. They proposed to increase the number of deputies from 120 to 134, while reducing the number of electoral districts for deputies to 31 (average M = 4.3) and increasing the number of senators from 38 to 44, to be elected from 15 districts with an average M of 3.1. Although this agreement did not prosper, it was notable for being the first time a party of the right had shown interest in adopting a more proportional formula.
The Political and Parliamentary Scenario in 2014
In 2014, the political scenario changed. The electoral reform had been a campaign promise of Michelle Bachelet, who had referred to "changing the present binomial electoral system for one of proportional representation" as a priority (Bachelet 2014b, 34) . As leader of the NM, Bachelet received 62.7 percent of the votes in the runoff, providing solid backing for the coalition's reform agenda. The results of the 2013 parliamentary elections predicted that the reform could pass without Alliance support. After March 2014, the NM would have 67 deputies (out of 120) in the CD and 21 senators (out of 38; see table 1). Assuming that the NM supported the reform, the government needed the votes of only 5 deputies and 2 senators to put an end to the binomial system. With a few defections on the right (mainly the new small party, Amplitud) and the possible support of some independent legislators, these votes were now accessible.
The Reform Bill and the Logic of the Redistricting
The NM set to work on the reform bill before the new government took office. PPD deputy Pepe Auth, PDC lawyer Patricio Zapata, the future minister of the interior, Rodrigo Peñailillo, and some of his advisers played significant roles in this process (Zapata 2015 The first concerns the main arguments the government advanced to justify the reform; namely, how it would contribute to strengthening the democratic system. Specifically, the government argued that the reform aimed at several interconnected objectives. One was to reduce the inequality of the vote (malapportionment). Under the binomial system, this was very high for the Chamber of Deputies, exceeding 17.8 percent when calculated using the Loosemore and Hanby index (1971) . With the proposed redistricting, it dropped to 10.6 percent. In the Senate, on the other hand, the records show no significant changes. Moreover, by providing that the electoral authority would recalibrate the M of each district every ten years, the new rules would prevent population changes from altering the distribution between voters and seats.
Another objective was to make the system more competitive. The binomial system (in which each party or list could present only two candidates per district) obliged parties that were part of a coalition like the CPPD to forgo presenting candidates in some districts in order to make space for other parties. Moreover, under this system the incumbents had a broad advantage and therefore little chance of being defeated. Thus, to some degree, the parties determined the results themselves, restricting the role of the voters. With the new rules (that is, a larger average M and the M x 2 rule), competition would increase, as would the role of the voters.
A third objective was to improve the representativeness of the system. The binomial system did not clearly reflect majorities and minorities. Legislative elections often left the sense of a "draw," given that in many districts, in races both for the CD and the Senate, the two largest coalitions each won one seat. Moreover, little space remained for candidates who did not belong to either of these coalitions. Indeed, from 1989 to 2013, 97.2 percent of elected deputies and 99.2 percent of elected senators were from CPPD/NM and Alliance lists. All this would change with the new system, which would introduce more competition and uncertainty and open the possibility for other groups to reach Congress. The proposed quota system law pointed in the same direction; in Bachelet's words, it aimed to "change the current unequal gender representation in the National Congress" (Bachelet 2014a ). The second element of the government's reform bill was the logic of the proposed redistricting. The government was clearly aware from the beginning that those voting on the reform would be incumbent legislators, and for this reason, the formula governing new districts and their sizes must not threaten those legislators' chances of re-election. The government calculated that three central considerations would reduce the incumbents' uncertainty. Redistricting was based on the existing districts, and for this reason the new districts did not affect the established territorial limits. For one thing, the proposal either preserved the existing districts or fused some of them together. For another, to make the proposal more attractive for parliamentarians (especially in the CD), the M of all the new districts was increased by at least 1 compared with the M they had under the binomial system. Thus, for example, in the districts that were preserved (there were 4), the M increased from 2 to 3, while the fused districts (24) have an M that is at least 1 more than the M they would have had by simple fusion. A similar logic was followed in the Senate, except for the remotest regions, which kept to M = 2. Overall, even though the proposal was not an improvement for those parliamentarians, it did not prejudice their chances of re-election.
The executive made it clear that the redistricting did not threaten the re-election of the great majority of parliamentarians. Table 3 , which is based on simulating how many parliamentarians (per party) would be elected if they received the same number of votes as in the 2013 election in their new district, shows extremely high percentages of (eventual) re-election. In the case of the NM, the reform predicts the re-election of 91 percent of its deputies. The highest value was for the PDC, which would retain 95.2 percent of its seats, and the lowest was for the PRSD and the PC, with 83.3 percent each. In the case of the Alliance, which did not support the reform, the rate of retention would be 87.7 percent.
Last but not least, there was an important effort to avoid the fusion of districts placing deputies of the same party in competition with one another. Of the 24 new districts built out of the fusion of existing districts, in only 10 was there a "clash" of deputies from the same party (see table 4 ). In 8 of these cases, the clash resulted from the fusion of districts in the same region, other than the Metropolitan Region. This was difficult to avoid, given the decision to construct districts by fusing existing ones, together with a constitutional requirement that districts must be within the same region. The Metropolitan Region, for its part, shrank from 16 districts (under the binomial system) to 7, so there was a greater chance of clashes between deputies of the same party. In this sense, it is well known that the districts were drawn on political criteria: of the 7 new districts, only 2 saw clashes. In this way, apart from providing parliamentarians with "guarantees of re-election," the new design sought to "minimize" competition between deputies of the same party. In this context, despite a few exceptions, legislators reacted positively to the proposed redistricting. This was evidently due to the government's efforts to reduce the levels of uncertainty incumbents might feel when they confronted the reform bill.
Main Issues in the Legislative Debate
The government developed an effective strategy to advance the reform. It aimed first to reach an agreement in the CD and from there to move the debate to the Senate. In this, it was successful. The CD approved the bill in August 2014, thanks to the votes of the NM, some independent parliamentarians, and Amplitud, a party consisting of former RN members. RN and UDI remained somewhat distant from the discussion, since their votes would not be necessary for the reform to pass. They opposed the bill using two arguments: that an increase in the number of parliamentary seats was unnecessary and would increase government expenditure; and that the drawing of the new districts was "customized" for the NM (El Mercurio 2015).
The bill approved in the CD retained the core elements of the original bill, in particular the redistricting proposal and the number of seats electable by district. However, three critical points needed addressing before the reform could advance.
In the NM, the first and most important point of contention was whether to allow the formation of subapparentments within each list.
2 The PPD and PS supported this idea, which was included in the bill, but the PDC categorically rejected it (Zapata 2015) . Despite being the largest party of the coalition, the PDC suspected that with this formula the leftist parties (PS, PPD, and PC) would form a subapparentment against it (which would command more votes than the PDC), thereby affecting the number of seats the PDC could obtain. We explain the party's argument in table 5, which shows the distribution of seats in a "no subapparentment" scenario and in another scenario with two subapparentments (one of the PDC and the other of the NM's left-wing parties). The simulation supposes that the apparentment gains five seats. In the "no subapparentment" scenario, the PDC (party 1) gains two seats. In the "with subapparentment" scenario, it gains only one.
The government understood that for the PDC this was a casus belli and that it had to agree to the PDC's petition if it wanted to count on the PDC's vote. In the event, the issue of the subapparentments did not feature in the discussion (La Tercera 2014).
The second issue was the number of candidates that each list could present. The original proposal of M x 2 (intended to solve the problem of the distribution of candidates among the NM parties) came in for strong criticism. It was finally replaced by M + 1, after independent deputies and the government reached an agreement (Zapata 2015) . According to the independent deputies, the M x 2 rule would lead to the presentation of too many candidates and would favor the best-resourced par-ties at the expense of independents. This would be a particularly critical factor in the largest districts. For example, in an M = 8 district, each list could compete with 16 candidates. In effect, the independent candidate-who is a list by himself-would be competing against at least 32 candidates. In this context, the independents would "disappear from view" in campaigns, greatly reducing their electability-considering, moreover, that the votes of the candidates of each list are added together to determine the winners (Cámara de Diputados 2014, 159). In this situation, the government felt obliged to give way, and it agreed to the M + 1 rule. This was certainly not an ideal situation from the point of view of the NM parties, which were looking for more space in the lists to resolve their bargaining problems. However, M + 1 was not a bad solution, either, as it notably improved their situation when compared to the binomial setup.
Furthermore, even though the original bill did not contemplate a change in the requirements for forming parties (and thereby for competing in elections), the CD introduced two changes. The first was to allow the formation of parties in a single region. The other was to reduce the percentage of signatures needed to form a party, from 0.5 percent to 0.25 percent, according to electoral participation in the immediately preceding election of deputies. These changes were the outcome of negotiations between the government, Amplitud, and independent parliamentarians, whose support was essential to pass the reform (El Mercurio 2014). Thus, the risk of a greater fragmentation of the system was a price the government and NM had to pay to end the binomial era.
With the bill approved in the CD, the debate moved to the Senate. The government was open to certain changes, but it would not accept under any circumstances the changes to the redistricting approved in the CD (Zapata 2015) . Thus, the senators introduced only one substantial change. The bill originally proposed that the Metropolitan Region (which has 39.6 percent of the voters) would elect 7 senators, while the Antofagasta region (Region II, with 3.3 percent of voters) and the Los Ríos region (Region XIV, with 2.2 percent) would each elect 2. The NM senators from Antofagasta, possibly nervous about their chances of re-election and arguing that regional representation should be strengthened, demanded that the M of their region should be increased by 1. So as not to place the reform at risk, while avoiding increasing the number of senators beyond 50, the government agreed to the request by removing 2 senators from the Metropolitan Region and adding 1 each to Antofagasta and Los Ríos. The government thereby secured the final approval of the bill (January 2015).
Having lost the vote, RN and UDI played their last card, appealing to the Constitutional Court to declare some aspects of the reform unconstitutional. Among other arguments, they maintained that the approved redistricting did not respect equality of the vote, in that some districts had significant differences in the number of seats up for election, despite having similar populations (Tribunal Constitucional 2015) . Nevertheless, the court confirmed the bill's constitutionality. The reform was promulgated in April 2015 (Law 20,840).
THE RESULT: THE NEW ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Having traced the reform's path through the congress and discussed its main features, we will now summarize its specific elements.
The number of parliamentarians to be elected increased from 120 to 155 in the CD and from 38 to 50 in the Senate.
Twenty-eight new districts were drawn for the election of the CD, which replaced the 60 existing ones. In the binomial system, each district elected two deputies. In the new system, a district magnitude is established that varies between three and eight (see table 6 ). This distribution of the district M (not of the total number of seats to be elected) is to be reviewed every ten years by the electoral authority, which may reassign the M of each district according to its proportion of the population. In no case may districts have fewer than three or more than eight deputies.
For electing the Senate, the number of districts is reduced from 19 to 15, also with a variable M, but in this case between 2 and 5. This change leaves the binomial system essentially unchanged for five districts (table 7) .
Unlike the binomial system, each list may include as many candidates as seats that are up for election, plus one. This is known as the M + 1 rule. As before, the lists are open.
Apparentments (electoral pacts between parties) at the national level are allowed, but not subapparentments.
For the first time in Chile, gender quotas apply to party lists. Neither male nor female candidates can exceed 60 percent of the total number of candidates presented by a party. In addition, the amount of the state reimbursement for each vote received for women candidates has increased. Furthermore, political parties will receive a bonus of about US$20,000 for each woman elected, whether as deputies or senators. These rules are applicable only for the 2017, 2021, 2025, and 2029 elections.
The requirements for creating parties have changed. Until 2014, the number of signatures parties had to collect was equivalent to 0.5 percent of the voters in the last election of deputies in 8 of the 15 regions, or in 3 geographically contiguous regions. Only by meeting this condition could parties present candidates in the respective regions. The reform allows the establishment of parties in a single region and with only 0.25 percent of the signatures, but they can present candidates only in the regions in which they are registered. Source: Prepared by the authors from official data from the 2012 census (Cooperativa 2012) and Law 20,840.
WHY THIS REFORM? INTERESTS BEFORE VALUES
Now that we have analyzed the reform process and described its final content, we shall discuss the real objectives its backers hoped to achieve. First, the evidence indicates that the main factor behind this reform was the NM's need to resolve a substantial problem related to the negotiation of coalition lists. In the meetings of experts, some of which leaked to the press (Rivas 2014), a central talking point was how to guarantee the survival of the center-left coalition. In the opinion of participants, this depended on raising the average M and increasing the number of candidates that each coalition could present. In this way, the new system would guarantee that the parties in the pact could present at least one candidate in the majority of districts, thus reducing internal party tensions and quarrels in the coalition over the selection process.
Being a coalition of many parties (the NM includes seven, while the CPPD had four) and with only 120 seats in the CD and 38 in the Senate for distribution, the center-left found that the negotiations had become particularly arduous. Moreover, parties had to drop out in some districts, thereby losing their ties with the electorate and leaving some potentially good candidates out of the race. Thus, for example, in Source: Prepared by the authors from official data from the 2012 census (Cooperativa 2012) and Law 20, 840. 2013, the PDC competed with candidates in districts representing 64.5 percent of the population; the percentage dropped to 40.7 percent for the PS, 39.7 percent for the PPD, 17 percent for the PRSD, and 15.5 percent for the PC. Percentages were higher in the Alliance due to the binomial system, in which an RN candidate and another from the UDI generally competed. Thus, RN competed in districts equivalent to 84 percent of the population, the UDI in districts equivalent to 95 percent. Table 8 shows the number of candidates with which each party competed in elections for deputies from 2001 to 2013. The number of seats now up for election and the average M per district (except for five senatorial districts) are much higher, and the lists can include a number of candidates equal to M + 1. Until 2013, the lists could present a maximum of 120 candidates (in the CD), but with the reform the number has risen to 183, an increase of 52.5 percent. In most districts, parties no longer need to drop out, lessening the tension of intracoalition negotiations. The same is true at the intraparty level.
We would add another consideration, hardly a minor one. As new groupings emerge within the center-left (as has been the case in recent years), more space is available for them to join the coalition, and thereby it avoids wasted votes. To use a colloquialism of Chilean politics, with the new reform "everyone is inside."
In addition to these factors, how relevant were other factors, such as those linked to general interests? Let us look first at the issue of proportionality. Despite the public discourse and the probability that the increase in the average M per district would result in greater proportionality (Farrell 2001, 161; Lijphart 1994, 48) , we do not believe that this was a major reason for the NM to seek reform of the rules. As table 9 shows, from 2001 on (and before as well), in every year the CPPD had a higher proportion of seats than of votes, in both the CD and the Senate. 3 For the Alliance, the disproportion was even greater, especially in the Senate. Those parties disadvantaged under the binomial system were the parties that competed from outside the big coalitions (especially the PC until 2005). In fact, in terms of the proportionality of representation of the two coalitions, the evidence shows that the binomial system did not prejudice the CPPD/NM. Furthermore, in 2013 the NM was overrepresented by 8.2 points in the CD and 9.4 points in the Senate, surpassing even the right. With the reform, there would be no improvement in this.
Thus the proportionality issues of the binomial system (derived from its M = 2 feature) did not significantly affect the NM as a whole, or the Alliance, either. Instead, it always adversely affected third political groupings. The evidence suggests, therefore, that resolving this problem cannot have been the NM's chief goal. Even so, we cannot be completely sure that this idea was not present, especially in order to avoid the occurrence of a tremendously disproportionate result in the future. Moreover, the NM knew that the 2013 result would not necessarily occur again; in 2001, with the same percentage of votes, the NM obtained five fewer deputies. We conclude that this consideration was not a primary factor in the NM's campaign for reform but indeed was a secondary factor. In fact, it was important to gain the support of independents and minor parties (such as Amplitud), which saw that the increase in the average M per district would make it easier for them to gain seats or maintain their representation without the need to join one of the main coalitions (Cámara de Diputados 2014).
Another important factor, the introduction of gender quotas, regardless of how successful the mechanism eventually turns out to be, was undoubtedly aimed at increasing the presence of women in the legislature (Jones et al. 2012) , which is very low despite an increase in recent years. 4 Since Bachelet's first presidential term (2006-10), the adoption of measures to reduce gender inequalities has been a constant feature of her political discourse (PNUD 2014, 231) . There is no doubt that her concern to increase the representation of women in Congress was genuine. Even so, quota laws could have been adopted just as well under the binomial system. Although gender quotas worked well as a general interest argument in promoting the reform, at a strategic level they did not have the same influence.
One more factor: one of the administration's arguments in defense of the reform was the need to address the problems of malapportionment. We do not believe that this was a main reason for the reform, as it only partly solved the problem. In fact, in the case of the Chamber of Deputies, the result was indeed very positive (see also Carey 2015) . Even when the definition of the new districts was based on the preexisting ones, the reform reduced malapportionment considerably: it fell from a ratio of 17.8 percent to 10.6 percent (calculated using the Loosemore and Hanby index). This advance met one of the stated objectives of the reform: to increase equality of the vote. Figure 1 , which compares both systems, shows the improvement, particularly in the central zone of the country and specifically in the Metropolitan Region (new districts 8 to 14). The vertical axis shows the value corresponding to the difference between the percentage of the population of each district and the percentage of seats assigned to it. A positive difference indicates that the district in question is "overrepresented"; that is, the number of seats it elects is above the relative weight of the population of that district. A negative difference indicates that the district is "underrepresented." The bars show the calculated values taking the 28 districts and 120 seats distributed in the binomial system. Although there were 60 districts in the binomial system, we perform the calculation on the 28 new districts in order to allow a comparison with the new electoral system. The line shows an identical calculation, but for the new electoral system. Naturally, the geographical distribution of malapportionment is similar in both systems, given that the new design is based on the earlier one. Equally, we note a slight worsening of malapportionment in the remote zones of the country, which is explained by an increase in their overrepresentation (remember that all now elect at least one extra deputy).
However, the result was not good in the Senate, which retained the binomial for 5 out of 15 regions. Under the binomial system, malapportionment had a value of 30.7 percent, whereas under the new system it increased to 32.6 percent. Thus, even though the reform achieved the objective at one level, at another it clearly did not, suggesting that this could hardly have been a central goal of the reform. On this point, an additional comment is in order. The evidence does not support the opposition's allegation that the redistricting was "made to measure" for the NM. Figure 2 shows that the correlation between the levels of over-and underrepresentation per district and the percentage of the NM's votes in the 2013 election of deputies is close to zero, and therefore does not necessarily favor the NM (r = 0.3; p = 0.1).
CONCLUSIONS
This article analyzed the Chilean electoral reform of 2015. In the first place, we showed that the NM's need to resolve problems caused by the binomial system was a major explanatory factor of the reform. In particular, we noted the difficulties the selection of candidates caused, given the number of the NM's component parties, and how candidate selection was often the subject of arduous and exacting negotiations. The new system largely resolved these problems by permitting a higher average M and allowing for more candidates in each list than seats to elect. At the same time, it was intended to help lessen intraparty conflicts. Factors speaking to the general interest were relevant also, but less importantly so. The reform favored competition and lowered the barriers of access to representation. This feature was a central factor in gaining the support of small parties and independent parliamentarians for the reform. We have discounted proportionality as a primary objective, as this was not a major problem for the NM under the binomial system. Nevertheless, we cannot rule this out as a secondary objective of the reform. Equally, although the amount of malapportionment fell, this was only the case for the Chamber of Deputies.
This reform process also points to a basic truth. When incumbent legislators vote on electoral reforms, proponents of the reforms must present the incentives with sufficient clarity. The incumbents must improve, or at least not worsen, their chances of re-election; and the drawing of the new districts must not be unduly "invasive," so that incumbents can feel secure about re-election under the new formula. The Chilean experience shows just how important gaining the loyalty of incumbents is in carrying out electoral reforms.
This new electoral system will make its debut in the 2017 legislative elections. Only then will we be able to analyze what the results reveal about the capacity of the traditional parties to retain their seats, party fragmentation, the impact of the quota law, the effect of the suppression of subapparentments, and the other factors. In practice, we will be able to see how close the reformers' expectations were to the actual electoral results.
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